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licka and Elie Kedourie. The author opts for Kymlicka’s criticism of 
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 In this paper I will write about the two very different and confronted con-
cepts of nationality: J. S. Mill’s and Lord Acton’s. I will try to show that this 
almost a hundred- and-fifty-year old disagreement on the concept of nation-
ality still has a lot of intellectual power and that some of these ideas cannot 
be avoided in contemporary discussions of the issue. My essay consists of 
three segments. The first one (A) presents Mill’s concept of nationality and 
Lord Acton’s criticism. 
 In the second segment (B), I compare two different understandings of the 
Mill – Acton disagreement. I will briefly present Kymlicka’s rejection of 
Mill’s ideas, and discuss in more detail Kedourie’s attempt to show that in 
essence Mill and Acton share the same concept of nationality. Kedourie’s 
understanding is quite original and, in my opinion, wrong. I will show why. 
 
 
20 Kurelić, Z., What Can We Learn from Lord Acton’s Criticism ...                                                                                                                             
 In the final part of the essay (C), I will try to answer the question from 
the title. For me, the question is the following: Can we today, when Croatia 
is trying to become a member of the European Union, learn something from 
the two distinguished English writers who wrote in the 19th century?  
 
A 
 J. S. Mill presented his thoughts on nationality in Considerations on 
Representative Government, chapter XVI ‘Of Nationality as Connected with 
Representative Government’. The title of the chapter is quite significant be-
cause Mill discusses nationality towards the end of the book on representa-
tive government (the book has 18 chapters). “A portion of mankind may be 
said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by 
common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others – 
which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other 
people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be 
government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively” (Mill, 
1988: 391). The essence of nationality is the national feeling, which is the 
will of the people to live together in their state. There is nothing natural or 
racial in Mill’s definition. A nation is not a biological unit, but a community 
based on a strong sentiment of nationality, like Switzerland, which is a na-
tion that consists of a few “different races”. “Where the sentiment of nation-
ality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the mem-
bers of the nationality under the same government, and a government to 
themselves apart” (Mill, 1988: 392). Consequently, this means that when in 
an empire there is no will to live together, there is no reason for its existence. 
It is not possible to organize a proper representative government in a state in 
which people do not want to live together. Mill explains: “Free institutions 
are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. 
Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak 
different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of 
representative government, cannot exist” (Mill, 1988: 392). This is probably 
the most important point of the entire chapter, and the reason why Mill dis-
cusses nationality in his book on representative government. It seems quite 
obvious that for Mill a nation state was the right setting for a representative 
government. So, ideas of separation and assimilation flow almost naturally 
from Mill’s original position. “If the unreconciled nationalities are geo-
graphically separate, and especially if their local position is such that there is 
no natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same government 
(as is the case of an Italian province under a French or German yoke), there 
is not only an obvious propriety, but if either freedom or concord is cared 
for, a necessity, for breaking the connection altogether” (Mill, 1988: 398).  
 Mill’s sentences on assimilation are even more dramatic, and, in our age 
of cultural sensitivity, they are almost vulgar. Without any hesitation Mill 
says: “Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and 
be absorbed in another: and when it was originally an inferior and more 
 
Politička misao, Vol. XLIII, (2006), No. 5, pp. 19–27 21 
                                                                                                                            
backward portion of human race the absorption is greatly to its advantage. 
Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a Breton, or a Basque of 
French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a 
highly civilised and cultivated people – to be a member of the French na-
tionality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French protection, 
and the dignity and prestige of French power – than to sulk on his own 
rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental 
orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. 
The same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as 
members of the British nation” (Mill, 1988: 395). So, in Mill’s opinion, a 
nation state – the ideal setting for a representative government – can be se-
cured by separation or assimilation. However, sometimes neither of the two 
solutions is possible. This was the case with Hungary, which was composed 
of Hungarians, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Germans and Romans. When numer-
ous nations are mixed in a way which makes separation impossible and as-
similation unthinkable, the only way, writes Mill, is “to make a virtue of ne-
cessity” and to live together in one state under equal rights and laws. Obvi-
ously, this is not a particularly promising setting for a representative gov-
ernment. Mill’s chapter is short and mercilessly clear. He sounds like a 
genuine liberal nationalist. 
 Lord Acton passionately disagrees with Mill’s ideas. He explains why in 
his famous essay titled, Nationality (1862). In Acton’s opinion, the theory of 
nationality is “more absurd and more criminal” than the theory of socialism, 
because its goal is neither liberty nor prosperity. It sacrifices both “to the 
imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the 
State” (Acton, 1948: 194). Acton recognizes a dangerous connection be-
tween the French Revolution and nationalism of the 19th century. The revo-
lution “taught the people to regard their wishes and wants as the supreme 
criterion of right” (Acton, 1948: 195). The new destructive force made a 
break with tradition and history. The sovereignty of people was born. Acton 
recognizes a direct link between the sovereignty of the people and national 
self-determination. In his opinion, they are essentially the same and equally 
undesirable. Mill’s nation state is rejected by Acton because it does not pro-
tect individual liberties as well as multinational states. Quite the contrary, 
nation states are a threat to liberty. “The presence of different nations under 
the same sovereignty is similar in its effect to the independence of the 
Church in the State. It provides against the servility which flourishes under 
the shadow of a single authority, by balancing interests, multiplying associa-
tions, and giving to the subject the restraint and support of a combined 
opinion. ... The diversity in the same State is a firm barrier against the intru-
sion of the government beyond the political sphere which is common to all 
into the social department which escapes legislation and is ruled by sponta-
neous laws. ... The co-existence of several nations under the same State is a 
test, as well as the best security of its freedom. It is also one of the chief in-
struments of civilization; and, as such, it is in the natural and providential 
order, and indicates a state of greater advancement than the national unity 
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which is the ideal of modern liberalism” (Acton, 1948: 185). For Lord Acton 
multinational empires like the Austro-Hungarian represent a perfect political 
framework for the protection of individual liberties and the development of 
the people in general. Consequently, separation and assimilation are rejected 
in the strongest terms. Both create nation states and stop inter-cultural, inter-
racial fertilization. For Acton the nation state is the political and cultural 
equivalent of inbreeding. On the other hand, multinational states create fruit-
ful interaction between nations and cultures. This simultaneously defends 
individual liberty and regenerates the entire society. Multinational states and 
empires tend towards diversity and harmony, while nation states towards 
uniformity and unity. The only type of nationality Acton supports is the 
purely political nationality formed by the state. In his opinion, Switzerland is 
the best example of political nationality because the Swiss are ethnically 
French, German or Italian, but the only nationality that has the claim upon 
them is the political one. Clearly, Acton completely rejects Mill’s argument 
presented in Chapter XVI of Considerations. 
 
B 
 The Mill-Acton debate on the concept of nationality was revisited by a 
number of political writers. In this segment of my paper, I will deal with two 
of them: Kymlicka and Kedourie. I decided to compare them because they 
clearly disagree. Kymlicka presents a standard understanding of the problem 
in his book, Multicultural Citizenship (1995) and uses J. S. Mill as a typical 
example of the old-fashioned anti-multiculturalist liberalism, while Kedourie 
presents a very original interpretation of the Mill-Acton discussion in his 
well known book, Nationalism (1960).  
 In Will Kymlicka’s opinion, J. S. Mill was a liberal nationalist and 
assimilationist. He is a key figure in the liberal tradition, so his attempt to 
link individual liberty with a representative government organized by a peo-
ple understood as a nation is paradigmatic. T. H. Green shared Mill’s belief 
that a common nationality gives a needed sense of political allegiance. 
Kymlicka holds that this type of liberalism has undesirable assimilationist 
consequences. “According to this stream of political thought, since a free 
state must be a nation state national minorities must be dealt with by coer-
cive assimilation or the redrawing of boundaries, not by minority rights” 
(Kymlicka, 1995: 52). So, minority rights are not discussed because Mill’s 
liberalism encourages assimilation and separation. Unlike Mill, Lord Acton 
argued that multination states check the abuse of state power and defend in-
dividual liberties much better than nation states. Acton’s and Mill’s ideas on 
the relationship between individual liberty and nationality cannot be recon-
ciled. Acton’s ideas are naturally much closer to Kymlicka’s attempt to rec-
oncile liberalism and multiculturalism; however, he does not try to reinter-
pret Acton in a multicultural way and only mentions him as a distinguished 
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member of the anti-assimilationist camp.1 Kymlicka sees the disagreement 
between Mill and Acton in a very standard way and recognizes the Millian 
approach as the origin of the problem he is trying to solve. 
 Kedourie’s thinking is quite different. Like Kymlicka, he has problems 
with liberal nationalism, but unlike Kymlicka, Kedourie wants to show that 
Mill and Acton are not all that different. In Nationalism, he criticizes Wood-
row Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ and tries to show why the Anglo-American 
understanding of nationality should be distinguished from the continental 
German-type nationalism. 
 President Woodrow Wilson introduced his famous ‘Fourteen Points’ in 
January 1918. The ‘Fourteen Points’ insisted on the right of national self-
determination. Wilson believed that “the peoples of Austria-Hungary should 
be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development” that “an in-
dependent Polish state ... should include the territories inhabited by indis-
putably Polish populations” and that “a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy 
should be affected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality” (Kedourie, 
1986: 130).  
 Kedourie finds the language of the ‘Fourteen Points’ dangerously 
nationalistic, and asks a question: How did an educated American president 
come to speak in this way? The answer is surprisingly simple. Wilson de-
rived his belief in the right of self-determination from his understanding of 
the American Revolution. He tried to apply the lessons of American experi-
ence in another historical and political context – post-World War I Europe, 
and he made a mistake. The fundamental principle of the American Revolu-
tion, writes Kedourie, was the right of the people to democratically organize 
their government. That doctrine has nothing to do with continental (Euro-
pean) nationalism. It is essentially Whiggism based on Locke’s political 
philosophy. The doctrine proclaimed “‘No taxation without representation’, 
and vindicated the rights of free-born Englishman. For such a doctrine, what 
is important is that men are able to decide freely who their rulers shall be ... 
and to guard the rights of the citizens from their encroachments. But it is 
quite easy to mistake the limits of this doctrine, and to believe that it entails 
propositions which it does not in any way entail” (Kedourie, 1986:131). 
 J. S. Mill was one of the thinkers who made this mistake, says Kedourie. 
In Considerations on Representative Government Mill insists that the 
 
1 “Other liberals argued the opposite position, that true liberty was only possible in a 
multination state. For example, Lord Acton argued, against Mill, that the divisions between na-
tional groups and their desire for an internal life of their own serves as a check against the ag-
grandizement and abuse of state power. This debate was revisited by British liberals during and 
after World War I. For example, Alfred Zimmern defended Acton’s claim that a multi-nation 
state checks the abuse of state power, while Ernest Barker, defended Mill’s belief that a nation-
state can best sustain free institutions. Here again very different views about the status of na-
tional minorities were defended, yet each side claimed that it represented the truly liberal view” 
(Kymlicka, 1995: 53).  
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boundaries of government should coincide with the boundaries of national-
ity, which is the fundamental principle of continental nationalism. Kedourie 
wants to show that Mill was actually not a nationalist because there is noth-
ing natural in his understanding of nationality. He simply believes that the 
question of government should be decided by the governed. The starting 
point of Mill’s thinking about nationality is also Whiggism, which automati-
cally makes any genuine nationalism impossible. “This theory assumes not 
so much that humanity ought to be divided into national, sovereign states, as 
that people who are alike in many things stand a better chance of making a 
success of representative government” (Kedourie, 1986:132). 
 For Kedourie, one of the best examples of Whiggism is Acton’s essay, 
Nationality, in which the author tries to protect the concept of individual lib-
erty and openly attacks the French Revolution and Mazzini’s concept of na-
tionality. What happened in 1918 was a misunderstanding. “The Englishmen 
and Americans were saying, People who are self-governed are likely to be 
governed well, therefore we are in favour of self-determination; whereas 
their interlocutors were saying, People who live in their own national states 
are the only free people, therefore we claim self-determination” (Kedourie, 
1986:133). So the problem rests in a mix-up between the sovereignty of the 
people and national self-determination. 
 Kedourie’s presentation of Wilson’s alleged mistake is very interesting. 
It looks as if Wilson, Acton and Mill share the same, or almost the same, 
concept of nationality; the concept based on the principle ‘No taxation with-
out representation’. I believe that the distinguished gentlemen interpreted in 
Kedourie’s intellectual operation would be very surprised at his conclusion 
for a number of reasons. Kedourie does not talk about the concept of the 
sovereignty of the people which was one of the fundamental principles of the 
American Revolution. This is not surprising because Lord Acton attacks the 
concept when he criticizes the French Revolution. Kedourie also forgets to 
point out that Acton attacked Mill’s understanding of nationality. If Mill and 
Acton are essentially the same, how could such a clever thinker like Acton 
not recognize this? Acton believed that Mill’s concept of nationality was 
very close to Mazzini’s. 
 What is the difference between Acton and Mill? Mill clearly does not be-
lieve that God’s plan was to divide Humanity into nations and that each na-
tion should have its own nation state, but it seems obvious to him that some-
times a nation-state is simply a necessary setting for democratic institutions. 
 Kedourie’s attempt to show that Acton and Mill are actually not very dif-
ferent cannot work because Mill believes that national self-determination 
and the sovereignty of the people are indistinguishable. “One hardly knows 
what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine 
with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to 
associate themselves” (Mill, 1988: 392).  
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 What about Kedourie’s thesis that W. Wilson was a Whig from America 
who did not understand Europe? How close are Acton and Wilson? Previ-
ously I showed that Acton recognized a link between the French Revolution 
and nationalism. This is not surprising because for Acton revolution is the 
worst enemy of civil freedom. Modern America was born in the Revolution 
which broke the connection with the British Empire in order to achieve na-
tional independence. Americans were certainly not a nation in European 
sense, but they were the people. This is why the concept of the sovereignty 
of the people plays such a big role in the American Revolution. As an 
American, W. Wilson recognizes the link between sovereignty and democ-
racy. Democracy for him is a form of self-government based on a new au-
thority – the people. Democracy is the self-government of the people. Sover-
eignty of the people is the essence of the Revolution and that idea is genu-
inely American. The people free from tradition, destroying the existing in-
stitutions in order to create a new constitution – this was Acton’s vision of 
Hell. The level of destruction was much lower in America than in France but 
the principle was the same. For Americans the rights of Englishmen were the 
rights of all mankind; for the French the rights belong to men and citizens, 
not to the members of the French nation. Both revolutions insist on abstract 
humanity. The sovereign is the people and the people consist of free and 
equal individuals, who have a right to create their institutions. There is 
nothing nationalistic in the French sovereignty of the nation because the na-
tion means the people.  
 If the concept of the sovereignty of the people is in the foundations of 
both revolutions and if only one ended up in terror it is impossible to con-
clude that the national sovereignty automatically leads either to revolution-
ary terror or totalitarianism. It is clear that the American understanding of 
self-government and Acton’s understanding of self-government are not the 
same. As an American, Wilson understood that sometimes it is necessary to 
break the connection with an empire in order to create democratic institu-
tions.  
 I believe that Mill and Wilson share the same understanding of national-
ity, and this understanding is different from Acton’s and Kedourie’s. Ke-
dourie’s theoretical operation is wrong. In a certain historical context, na-
tional self-determination can become a presupposition for a democratic con-
stitution, and that is a possibility which is almost unthinkable for Kedourie. 
That is why he had to reinterpret Mill and Wilson, and that is the reason for 
his error. In my opinion, the standard interpretation of the Mill-Acton dis-
agreement on nationality, the one also shared by Kymlicka, is correct. What 
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C 
 The first question I asked myself when revisiting Mill’s and Acton’s 
thoughts on nationality was whether any of their moves could be used in a 
historical moment in which a newly created nation-state, like Croatia is try-
ing to join a multinational union, such as the EU?  
 Mill and Wilson would perfectly understand Slovenia’s decision to sever 
the ties with the former Yugoslavia. They would also understand Croatia’s 
decision to do the same but would probably find it too costly. What about 
Croatia’s attempt to become a member of the European Union? A slightly 
reinterpreted Acton can be useful for those who are enthusiastic about the 
EU. In the self-perception of a number of Croats, Croatian culture is distin-
guished from Balkan culture by its essential European nature. This may be a 
delusion but it is a helpful one in this moment of national history. We cannot 
be forcefully assimilated into European culture when the fact that we are al-
legedly already very European distinguishes us from, let’s say, the Serbs. So 
the fear that we will lose the right to make cottage cheese in a traditional 
way, or the right to slaughter pigs in our backyards may not be all that pow-
erful and politically important. There is virtually nobody in this country who 
believes that our culture should be protected from the wicked European in-
fluence like the Amish or Native Americans are protected in the US. There is 
no real fear of assimilation into another culture or nation. Croatian citizens 
are afraid that the Croatian state will lose its sovereignty. This fear should be 
distinguished from nationalism, because it is shared by Croatian citizens 
who do not have strong national feelings. It can also be argued that Croatia’s 
importance and international standing would actually increase with its mem-
bership in the European Union. In addition, one could make a case, in a 
clearly Actonian way, that membership in the EU would secure the satisfac-
tory rule of law and increase the protection of individual liberties. 
 Both Mill and Acton believed that some nations and races are more 
developed than others, but Acton was not an assimilationist. So in the case 
of Croatia, Acton is more useful than Mill because it would be difficult to 
argue that to live with other European nations within the EU would not be 
beneficial for Croatia, and it would be really arrogant to deny that some of 
them are more developed than us. 
 However, if Mill’s idea that a functioning representative government pre-
supposes a community of people with fellow feeling capable of creating a 
united public opinion is correct, the future of democratic institutions of the 
EU does not look very bright. The European Union is not a community, es-
pecially not a political community. However, if one accepts Kedourie’s in-
terpretation according to which Mill believed that “the people who are alike 
in many things stand a better chance of making a success of representative 
government”, one could hope that Europeans are capable of becoming a 
watered-down version of the Swiss, the only nation Mill and Acton agree on.  
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